



INDEPENDENT
TRANSPORT
SAFETY AND
RELIABILITY
REGULATOR

28 April 2006

The Hon John Watkins MP
Deputy Premier and Minister for Transport
Level 30, Governor Macquarie Tower
1 Farrer Place
Sydney NSW 2000

Dear Minister

I am pleased to provide the fifth Quarterly Report on the implementation of the Government's response to the recommendations contained within the Final Report of the Special Commission of Inquiry (SCOI) into the Waterfall Accident.

As with previous Reports, this Report is provided one month after the completion of the quarter and reflects implementation progress from 1 January 2006 to 31 March 2006. The next report will reflect the progress made in the quarter 1 April 2006 to 30 June 2006.

Yours sincerely

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Carolyn Walsh'.

Carolyn Walsh
Chief Executive

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ABBREVIATIONS

ALARP	As Low As Reasonably Practicable
ARA	Australasian Railway Association
ATP	Automatic Train Protection
ARTC	Australian Rail Track Corporation
CMC	Code Management Company
CRM	Crew Resource Management
D&A	Drug and Alcohol
ESA	Emergency Service Agencies
ITSRR	Independent Transport Safety and Reliability Regulator
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NROD	National Rail Occurrence Database
NRSAP	National Rail Safety Accreditation Package (also known as NAP or National Accreditation Package)
NTC	National Transport Commission
OH&S	Occupational Health and Safety
OTSI	Office of Transport Safety Investigation
PN	Pacific National Pty Ltd
RIC	Rail Infrastructure Corporation
RC	RailCorp
RMC	Rail Management Centre
RLAP	Rail Legislation Advisory Panel
RSRP	Rail Safety Regulators Panel
RSW	Rail Safety Workers
SCOI	Special Commission of Inquiry
SMS	Safety Management Systems
SMSEP	Safety Management Systems Expert Panel
TACE	Transport Agencies Chief Executives

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Special Commission of Inquiry (SCOI) into the Waterfall Rail Accident released its Final Report on 17 January 2005. In accordance with the Commission's recommendations, the NSW Government agreed that the Independent Transport Safety and Reliability Regulator (ITSRR) should report quarterly on implementation progress. This is the fifth Quarterly Report. It outlines progress made between 1 January 2006 and 31 March 2006.

Implementation Summary

Substantial implementation progress was made during the quarter with significant numbers of recommendations nominated for closure by agencies or verified and closed by ITSRR:

- ITSRR validated and closed out 48 (27%) recommendations (40 RailCorp, 2 NSW Emergency Services, 2 RailCorp and NSW Emergency Services and 4 ITSRR) in the following areas:
 - A training DVD for emergency personnel covering general rail safety training with additional training days being conducted in the field;
 - A new safety culture plan for RailCorp;
 - New regulations to mandate requirements for the inter-operability of train radio communications between all trains operating on the NSW rail network in an emergency situation;
 - Increased penalties for offences relating to interference with train doors and unauthorised use of certain safety equipment, and
 - Implementation of RailCorp's safety management system and risk management framework.

- Target dates for implementation of remaining recommendations remain on schedule, except for 3 (2%) recommendations largely concerning documentation of emergency response procedures which are scheduled for completion for the most part by the end of July 2006. These slippages

(detailed on page 11) do not pose immediate or significant safety risks to the NSW traveling public.


At the end of the reporting period, the cumulative implementation progress to date for all 177 recommendations (including 127 recommendations and 50 sub-elements) was as follows:

- 110 (62%) recommendations are verified and closed¹;
- A further 33 recommendations (19%) are currently claimed for closure by agencies and are currently being verified by ITSRR;
- A further 13 (7%) recommendations are due for completion by the end of 2006;
- 1 (0.5%) recommendation (the introduction of national communications technical standards) will be implemented by 2010 (unchanged from last quarter); and
- 20 (11.5%) recommendations referred to the National Transport Commission (NTC) have revised implementation timeframes based on advice from the NTC (unchanged from last quarter).

This brings the total number of recommendations currently closed or claimed by agencies to be closed (and being verified by ITSRR) to 143 or 81% of all recommendations. A further 13 recommendations are due to be implemented during 2006, bringing the total number due for completion by the end of 2006 to 156 or 88%. The remaining 21 relate to standards redevelopment and design issues. The current status of all of the safety actions, compared to their status in the previous quarters, is summarised below:

¹ including 5 that were rejected by the NSW Government and 1 which is no longer applicable

GRAPH 1: PROGRESSIVE STATUS ALL RECOMMENDATIONS BY QUARTER



As time progresses, it is expected that the peak will shift along the x-axis until all recommendations are closed.

Quarterly Progress

Recommendations Verified and Closed

In the reporting period, ITSRR verified and closed 48 recommendations and sub-elements. Forty of these were the responsibility of RailCorp. They included:

- Development of action emergency checklists for inclusion in RailCorp's emergency response plan (Recommendation 19);
- Implementation of RailCorp's Safety Risk Management Framework (Recommendation 34 a-h);
- Implementation of effective procedures to ensure recording in a data base of all train drivers' defects reports and tracking of these to finalisation (Recommendation 48);

- Preparation of a safety culture plan incorporating SCOI recommendations with subsequent review and acceptance by ITSRR (Recommendation 83 (a) - (n));
- An education program for Level 2 Managers to obtain formal qualifications in Systems Safety Management together with amended position descriptions requiring Level 2 Managers to have these qualifications (Recommendation 102);
- Implementation of an external auditing program which includes reports to RailCorp's Management Board on the effectiveness of its integrated safety management system and on safety performance generally (Recommendation 104);
- A full review of the safety competence of RailCorp managers to ensure that each has the ability to bring about those safety reforms recommended in the SCOI Report applicable to his or her position (Recommendation 106);
- Introduction of an internal and external audit program to evaluate the adequacy of RailCorp's safety management system and to ensure that any risk control measures are effective (Recommendation 108);
- Appointment of a Safety Reform Program Director to manage safety reform being undertaken by RailCorp (Recommendation 110 a – e); and
- Incorporation of SCOI recommendations into RailCorp's Safety Management System (SMS) (Recommendation 122 f) parts (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vii) and (xii)).

The four ITSRR recommendations closed included:

- The requirement for all trains to be fitted with a minimum of two engineering defences against driver incapacitation. RailCorp has completed the fitting of a second engineering defence for its passenger trains. In its response to

the SCOI report, the Government agreed that ITSRR should undertake a review of the need for second defences in other trains in NSW (eg heritage operators, freight trains and track maintenance vehicles). ITSRR has completed its review (which is available on its website). The review has found that existing defences in heritage, passenger and freight operations (with second persons riding with the driver) are sufficient, however operators of track maintenance vehicles should undertake further risk assessments of their defence systems. This recommendation has therefore been closed as “acceptable alternative response” on the understanding that freight operators should retain the second driver unless that position is replaced with a second defence, and that ITSRR will continue to oversight the review by track maintenance vehicle operators of their defence systems (Recommendation 31).

- Introduction of a regulation to ensure that there is interoperability of communications equipment between all trains operating on the New South Wales rail network (Recommendation 46);
- A review and acceptance of RailCorp’s safety culture plan (Recommendation 84); and
- Introduction of increased penalties (from 50 penalty units (\$5,500) to 250 penalty units (\$27,500) for improper use of train safety and emergency equipment (Recommendation 94).

The two NSW Emergency Services recommendations closed included:

- Location of the command post for site control at the scene of a rail accident is now easily identified by NSW Police using green flashing lights together with Site Controller tabards placed at strategic locations (Recommendation 15); and

- Emergency services personnel were trained in the location and operation of emergency door release mechanisms on all rail cars (Recommendation 97).

The two RailCorp and NSW Emergency Services recommendations closed included:

- RailCorp's emergency response plan was provided to all emergency response agencies and relevant officers were trained in rail specific features of the plan (Recommendation 21); and
- Emergency response personnel were trained in the features of railways relevant to their work, such as the location and means of operation of all emergency door releases on trains (Recommendation 23).

Recommendations Claimed for Closure (and being verified)

During the reporting period, a further 5 recommendations were claimed for closure by RailCorp. These include:

- Training of relevant staff at RailCorp's Rail Management Centre in emergency assessment and response (Recommendation 1);
- Implementation of a system at RailCorp's Rail Management Centre to enable the identification of the precise location of trains on the RailCorp network (Recommendation 4);
- Revision of RailCorp's passenger containment policy (Recommendation 88);
- Establishment of clear accountability statements and reporting lines for all management positions within RailCorp (Recommendation 103); and
- Management of safety action plans arising from external audits (Recommendation 109).

Slippage

During the reporting period, one recommendation was not implemented by the scheduled date and the target dates for two other recommendations were revised based on advice from the responsible agency. In ITSRR's view, these recommendations do not pose immediate or significant safety risks to the NSW traveling public. The slippages in timeframes are scheduled for completion by the end of July 2006. The recommendations that slipped are in the following areas:

- Establishment of a training centre for emergency services personnel (Recommendation 28). RailCorp has established the training centre at Petersham. The State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC) has inspected the training facility and requested the State Rescue Board to inspect the facility to confirm its suitability. The State Rescue Board is expected to report back to the SEMC during the next quarter (slippage of three months).
- Development of a railway disaster plan by RailCorp and Emergency Services and for RailCorp to develop and implement an emergency response plan for the management of all rail incidents (Recommendations 10 & 18).

RailCorp has developed an Incident Management Framework (IMF) for the management of emergencies. The slippages primarily relate to the completion of Group and Local plans which support the IMF. The absence of these plans does not diminish RailCorp's capacity to respond to incidents in line with the IMF. Through RailCorp's Emergency Exercise Program, ITSRR has observed that processes are in place and that RailCorp continues to develop its capability to respond to such incidents. RailCorp has advised ITSRR these supporting plans will be in place by 31 July 2006 (slippage of four months).

METHODOLOGY

This section briefly outlines the processes which ITSRR has instituted to develop and monitor the Implementation Plan for the Government's response to the SCOI Final Report into the Waterfall Rail Accident. Full details of these methods may be found in Appendix 2.

Implementation Plan

ITSRR has reviewed the SCOI Final Report and determined the actions required to implement each recommendation (in line with the Government's response) and which company or agency has responsibility for that action. These expectations formed the basis for determining whether the response put forward by a company or agency is appropriate to meet the recommendation and/or satisfy the safety objective of the recommendation.

Responsible agencies have assigned indicative timeframes for each safety action and ITSRR has reviewed the appropriateness of them to ensure the timeframes are feasible and that processes are in place to adequately monitor progress as well as to give sufficient notice and justification to ITSRR for any changes to the implementation plan. Timeframes agreed with responsible companies or agencies have, to the greatest extent possible, been made realistic and achievable. Details of the Implementation Plan and progress against it may be found in Appendix 3.

Classification System for Recommendations

In order to provide a graduated view of progress against the Implementation Plan, ITSRR has developed a classification system to indicate the relative status of each recommendation. The taxonomy for the Classification System has been drawn from accepted international practice. Appendix 1 includes tables and graphs of the current implementation status of recommendations.

Slippage

In reporting slippage against the agreed timeframes in the Implementation Plan, ITSRR uses the following guide:

- If a claim for closure was expected by the conclusion of the reporting quarter but was not received then it is recorded as slippage;
- If a claim for closure is submitted to ITSRR by the end of the reporting quarter but the target date was earlier in the quarter, it will not be recorded as slippage; and
- If a revised target date for implementation was received from an agency but action will be completed within the original reporting quarter then it is not recorded as slippage. However in the event that the revised target date is not met, ITSRR will record the event as a slippage.


SUMMARY OF PROGRESS

The SCOI was given the task of identifying the causes of the Waterfall accident and ways of preventing such accidents in the future. The Commission was also asked to examine what might lead to overall improvements in the safety management of rail operations in NSW. The SCOI Final Report grouped recommendations under 19 safety themes. These relate to both the causes of the accident and to suggested improvements in the overall management of safety on the NSW rail network.

In this Report, implementation progress is summarised against these 19 safety themes. It outlines progress in the reporting quarter, any slippage against agreed timeframes and any action taken by the responsible agency and/or ITSRR to address slippage. This approach provides the necessary transparency to ensure appropriate public scrutiny of progress made in implementing the Government's response to the SCOI Final Report.

The graph below illustrates the status of recommendations as at 31 March 2006. As time progresses it is expected that the peak will shift along the x-axis until all recommendations are closed.

GRAPH 1: PROGRESSIVE STATUS OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS BY QUARTER



Emergency Response

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 1-28

These recommendations relate to the Commission's findings that emergency response procedures to the Waterfall Rail Accident were inadequate. They are intended to ensure that (in the event of a future rail accident) RailCorp has effective procedures in place that will enable it to locate the accident site, secure and isolate it, ensure safety at the site and facilitate access of emergency services. The recommendations also aim to ensure that any such emergency response is coordinated between relevant parties and is timely. These recommendations require the provision of supporting emergency procedures and appropriate training in those procedures.

In the reporting period the following recommendations were closed and verified by ITSRR:

- The location of the command post for site control at the scene of a rail accident will now be identified by green flashing lights together with Site Controller tabards placed at strategic locations. ITSRR will assess the effectiveness of these lights as part of its monitoring program of emergency exercises (Recommendation 15).
- RailCorp has developed Checklists for the Shift Manager and Rail Commander in the Rail Management Centre (RMC) which outline the steps to follow in an emergency (Recommendation 19).
- RailCorp has developed and issued a training DVD to Emergency Services personnel which includes general rail safety training, emergency door release locations and protocols for liaison between rail management and emergency services in an emergency. The DVD was endorsed by the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC) (Recommendation 21).
- In addition to the issuing of the DVD, training days were also conducted in the field with Emergency Response personnel trained in the features of railways relevant to their work, such as the location and means of operation of all emergency door releases on trains. There is also a program

specifically for Fire Brigades and Ambulance personnel which includes instruction and tours of the underground CBD rail network (Recommendation 23).

During the quarter, ITSRR continued verification of Recommendations 6 and 25. These recommendations are integral to the management of rail emergencies where an immediate priority is the safety of the site which may include removal of power to the overhead 1500 volt power supply and the stopping of oncoming trains to ensure the safety of passengers, crew, nearby members of the public and emergency services personnel. ITSRR expects to validate further information provided by RailCorp in order to complete the verification of these recommendations by the end of April 2006 (Recommendations 6 and 25).

Design and Procurement of Rollingstock SCOI Final Report Recommendations 29 & 30

The Commission recommended that all railway operators should have a quality assurance program in place for the design and construction of rollingstock and that the rail safety regulator should set standards for the design, manufacture, testing and commissioning of rollingstock to ensure that it is fit for purpose.

In December the National Transport Commission (NTC) agreed to develop national regulations for rollingstock specifying requirements that rail operators will need to include in their SMS for the safe management of rollingstock. To complement these requirements, national rollingstock standards are being developed by the Australasian Railway Association (ARA) through its Code Management Company (CMC).

Until the revised rollingstock standards are in place, ITSRR continues to require all NSW accredited operators to comply with the "minimum operating standards for rollingstock" (MOSRS) - a set of detailed technical safety

standards – as part of the SMS. ITSRR monitors compliance with these standards through its existing compliance program.

Driver Safety Systems

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 31-33

These recommendations are intended to minimise the risk of an accident in the event of train driver incapacitation by requiring the fitting of two independent engineering defences to all trains. In the longer term SCOI recommended the introduction of Automatic Train Protection (ATP). The Government supports this in principle; however, its application on an industry-wide basis needs to be determined. ATP systems are more advanced technologies which can automatically override a driver if a train is behaving in an unauthorised way in relation to network constraints.

Engineering Defences

ITSRR currently requires through the existing accreditation process all driver-only trains (i.e. one person in the driver's cab) to be fitted with two independent engineering defences. As noted in previous reports, RailCorp has installed a second engineering defence (Vigilance System) in its passenger fleet and has therefore implemented this recommendation.

In its response to the SCOI report, the Government agreed that ITSRR should undertake a review of the need for second defences in other trains in NSW (eg heritage and passenger operators, freight trains and track maintenance vehicles). The results of these studies are available on the ITSRR website www.transportregulator.nsw.gov.au

The review has found that existing defences in heritage, passenger and freight operations (with second persons riding with the driver) are sufficient, however operators of track maintenance vehicles should undertake further risk assessments of their defence systems. ITSRR has written to all companies accredited to operate track maintenance vehicles advising the results of these studies and requesting operators to review their risk assessments and

operating procedures and advise ITSRR by 1 October 2006 of any intended action or measures to be implemented.

This recommendation has therefore been closed as “acceptable alternative response” on the understanding that freight operators should retain the second driver unless that position is replaced with a second defence, and that ITSRR will continue to oversight the review by track maintenance vehicle operators of their defence systems (Recommendation 31).

Automatic Train Protection (ATP)

RailCorp is continuing work analysing options for improved ATP systems for the NSW network and is due to report to Government on these options in September 2006 (Recommendation 32).

In the interim, national rollingstock standards are under development by the Australasian Railway Association (ARA) through its Code Management Company (CMC). In order to successfully implement any ATP proposal, rollingstock standards will need to be revised to accommodate any new requirements. To progress this, ITSRR has accepted the ARA’s invitation to participate in the development of these standards (Recommendation 33).

Risk Assessment and Risk Control Procedures

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 34

Recommendation 34 and its sub-elements seek to make the rail network safer by ensuring that RailCorp has in place processes to systematically identify and assess risks on the network and put appropriate control measures in place to reduce or eliminate circumstances which might result in an accident.

Following the Waterfall Accident, RailCorp engaged Lloyd’s Register Rail, a recognised safety engineering firm, to work with it to develop a risk management framework and implementation strategies that would provide

RailCorp with good risk management processes and a robust risk control register.

ITSRR reviewed RailCorp's Safety Risk Management Framework and Hazard Identification and Safety Risk Assessment Guidance documents together with RailCorp's Risk Register during RailCorp's annual audit. The results of the audit supported closure of sub-elements a, b, c, e, f and h of this recommendation. During the reporting period ITSRR verified and closed the remaining sub-elements d and g. Recommendation 34 a – h is now closed.

Data Loggers

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 36 and 37

Effective use of data loggers can provide investigators with information to help them in the conduct of any accident or incident investigation to understand the causes of accidents or incidents on the rail network. Data loggers can also assist rail operators monitor driver performance and train operations. Data loggers record information on a train's operations; including, for example, speed during a journey. The National Transport Commission has agreed to develop a national regulation for data loggers subject to the outcome of an impact assessment. The NTC advises that the impact assessment will be conducted in the fourth quarter of 2006.

Communications

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 38- 46

These recommendations address two important issues. First, that standardised communications protocols should be in use on the NSW rail network so that rail employees use clear and well understood language when communicating with each other. This is particularly important in emergency situations. Second, the compatibility and inter-operability of communications equipment (radios for example), so that in an emergency drivers, signalers,

train controllers and other relevant personnel (with different types of equipment) are able to talk to each other.

In the reporting quarter the following recommendation was closed and verified:

- The *Rail Safety (General) Amendment (Miscellaneous) Regulation 2006* was made to mandate requirements for the inter-operability of train radio communications between all trains operating on the NSW rail network in an emergency situation. This means that passenger and freight trains operating on the NSW rail network must have a radio communications system that is compatible and interoperable in an emergency situation, as well as a back up system. The regulation will commence on 1 September 2006. ITSRR released an "Information Alert" on its website on 7 April 2006 advising operators of this regulation (Recommendation 46).

The National Transport Commission has agreed to develop a national regulation for communication systems/protocols subject to the outcome of an impact assessment. The NTC advises that the impact assessment will be conducted in the fourth quarter of 2006.

Train Maintenance

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 47-53

The purpose of these recommendations is to ensure there are minimum standards and inspections in place for RailCorp trains entering service and adequate maintenance plans and systems in place to record and rectify train defects, as well as certification of work by an appropriately qualified individual.

During the reporting quarter ITSRR verified that RailCorp has a system for recording and tracking train defects to finalisation. Ongoing internal audits conducted by RailCorp demonstrate a commitment to the system's continuous improvement. Therefore this recommendation is now closed (Recommendation 48).

ITSRR continued to verify RailCorp's claim for closure for Recommendation 53 to ensure that trains are inspected at the time of stabling prior to entering into service. RailCorp has provided additional documentation that describes its maintenance and inspection procedures for the passenger train fleet. In the next quarter ITSRR will meet with RailCorp to discuss this documentation (Recommendation 53).

Alcohol and Drug Testing

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 54-56

These recommendations are intended to ensure random drug and alcohol (D&A) testing continue and that testing is made mandatory following an incident. The *Rail Safety Act 2002* and supporting D&A testing regulations and guidelines require accredited operators to have a D&A program in place. They enable operators to conduct post-incident D&A testing, but do not explicitly require post-incident testing.

During the reporting period, ITSRR progressed the proposal to amend existing regulations and guidelines to require mandatory D&A testing following certain accidents and/or incidents. The proposal was released for comment on 23 December 2005 with industry input due by 17 February 2006. ITSRR received considerable industry comment on the need for clear definitions on which incidents will require post-incident testing. It is anticipated that the amended regulations and guidelines will be completed by 30 April 2006.

Periodic Medical Examinations

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 57(a)-(j)

This recommendation is directed at minimising the risk of incapacitation of a train driver through more stringent standards for periodic medical examinations for railway safety critical workers. The majority of safety actions required for this recommendation have been implemented, verified and closed through the

adoption of the National Standard for Health Assessment of Rail Safety Workers.

Recommendations 57(d)-(f) were referred to the National Transport Commission (NTC) for review through the maintenance process for the National Standard for Health Assessment of Rail Safety Workers. NTC envisages that this process will be completed by April 2006.

Safety Document Control

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 58-64

Effective document control, particularly document control of safety information, is a critical element of a rail operator's safety management system. Employers and employees must be confident that the safety information they are operating under is current and accurate.

During the quarter ITSRR continued to verify RailCorp's claim for closure of Recommendations 58 & 59 concerning implementation of a safety document management system referred to as the Safety Knowledge Management System. ITSRR has requested RailCorp to provide a comprehensive list of safety documents contained within its SKMS together with an explanation of the processes for the updating and distribution of these documents. In the next quarter, ITSRR will review this list of safety documents and associated procedures in consultation with RailCorp.

Train Driver and Guard Training

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 65 - 71

It is important that train drivers and train guards are adequately trained in the performance of their duties. This issue was also raised by the SCOI into the Glenbrook accident. Of particular interest for training is the appropriate use of simulators, encouragement of teamwork, and the development of training based on a needs analysis.

RailCorp continued to progress the following during the reporting period:

- Reviewed its current training programs for different categories of rail safety workers to ensure training programs are determined by a thorough needs analysis and reflect an appropriate competence management regime based on the skills and attributes required to carry out defined tasks (Recommendation 70); and
- Created and introduced appropriate positions with responsibility for ensuring each train driver's training needs are being met and any safety concerns of drivers are being properly addressed (Recommendation 71).

ITSRR requested RailCorp to re-submit its claim for closure for recommendations 65, 66, 67 and 68 in order to provide additional evidence of actions taken to satisfy these recommendations. RailCorp did so on 29 March 2006. ITSRR continues verification and anticipates closing these recommendations in the next quarter.

Rail Accident Investigation

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 72 - 82

The SCOI Final Report promulgated "just culture" investigations (ie, those aimed at determining all the factors contributing to an accident, including systemic factors rather than attempting to allocate blame or liability), as more likely to contribute to improved safety outcomes in the longer term. Recommendations 72 -74 and 82 concern the powers of, and relationship between, the NSW Office of Transport Safety Investigations (OTSI) and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB). All of these recommendations have been verified and closed.

Safety Culture

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 83 - 84

It is accepted safety practice that a positive safety culture works in tandem with a safety management system to deliver safe operations. The safety culture

recommendations require a plan from RailCorp and a subsequent review by ITSRR. During the reporting period RailCorp submitted further information regarding its safety culture plan recommendation 83 (a) – (n) which ITSRR reviewed and accepted (Recommendation 84). Recommendations 83 (a) - (n) and Recommendation 84 are now closed.

Occupational Health and Safety

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 85- 87

Recommendations 85-87 articulated the SCOI's concern that RailCorp's approach to safety management was overly focused on occupational health and safety (OHS). By this it meant that RailCorp primarily sought to implement risk control measures for risks of relatively low consequence, but high frequency, to the detriment of more significant risks of relatively high consequence, but low frequency. The SCOI recommended integration of OHS management into RailCorp's overall safety management system, so that broader public safety concerns, such as derailments or collisions, would receive greater attention.

Closure of these recommendations is dependent upon implementation of Recommendation 34. All three recommendations relate to systems for the management of risk. Recommendation 34 was verified and closed during the reporting quarter. Therefore, ITSRR may now verify and close recommendations 85 and 86 which it expects to do by the end of April 2006.

Passenger Safety

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 88-101

These recommendations address emergency egress and access (ie, ways in which passengers can escape from trains in an emergency and the way emergency services and other rescuers can get into trains), emergency evacuation procedures and associated training and standards, as well as the adequacy of penalties for misuse of emergency and other safety related equipment.

In the reporting period the following recommendations were closed and verified:

- ITSRR reviewed penalties under the *Rail Safety Act 2002*, *Crimes Act 1990* and the *Rail Safety (General) Regulation 2003* to determine whether existing penalties were significant and appropriately provided for a deterrent for tampering with emergency escape equipment. As a result, ITSRR advised the Government to increase the penalty for improper use of train safety and emergency equipment from 50 penalty units (\$5,500) to 250 penalty units (\$27,500) to reflect the potential serious consequences of such a breach and to deter offenders. Furthermore, ITSRR recommended that penalties for interference with train doors also be increased from 10 penalty units to 50 penalty units. Amendments to the regulation were made and came into effect on 31 March 2006 (Recommendation 94); and

- A training DVD was developed by RailCorp for general rail safety training for emergency services personnel which includes the location of emergency door release mechanisms and protocols for liaison with rail management when going on or about the running lines. The issuing of this DVD was endorsed by the State Emergency Committee (SEMC) and distributed by the Office of Emergency Services to all emergency services organisations in the reporting quarter (Recommendation 97).

During the quarter, RailCorp also claimed closure for its decision to replace its full containment policy based upon the results of a detailed independent risk assessment conducted on the best methods for protecting passenger safety in emergencies requiring evacuation from a train. ITSRR will review RailCorp's proposal in the next quarter (Recommendation 88).

RailCorp completed its program to fit keyless emergency external door release mechanisms to the external doors of its passenger train fleet during the reporting period (Recommendation 91). Detailed recommendations referring to the mandated requirements of an egress standard (Recommendations 89-95 and 98-101) are being progressed by ITSRR through the NTC's national regulation development process. As noted in the last quarterly report, ITSRR recognises that these prescriptive recommendations for inclusion in standards may not be appropriate for "all passenger trains". ITSRR accepts the intent of the recommendations but would expect operators to apply them subject to a risk assessment.

Corporate Governance

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 102- 109

These recommendations introduce requirements for formal qualifications in system safety management for managers who report to the CEO of RailCorp. They also require development of safety accountability statements and reporting lines for all management positions and the introduction of independent external and internal audit processes to be managed by the RailCorp Board.

During the reporting period ITSRR verified and closed the following recommendations:

- All RailCorp's Level 2 Managers have completed a two day training course in Systems Safety Management and the position description for each manager now reflects such criteria. (Recommendation 102);
- Implementation of an external auditing program to regularly audit and report to the RailCorp Board on the implementation of an integrated safety management system by RailCorp and on safety performance generally (Recommendation 104);
- RailCorp conducted a full review of the safety competence of its managers to ensure that each has the ability to bring about those safety reforms recommended in the SCOI Report applicable to his or her position. (Recommendation 106); and
- Introduction of an internal and external audit program to evaluate the adequacy of its safety management system and to ensure that any risk control measures are effective (Recommendation 108).

The following progress was made during the quarter:

- RailCorp submitted claims for closure for the establishment of safety accountability statements and reporting lines for all management positions and implementation of safety action plans for issues arising from external audits. ITSRR will verify these recommendations in the next quarter (Recommendations 103 and 109).
- ITSRR continued to verify implementation of Recommendations 105 and 122. Closure of Recommendation 122 also satisfies Recommendation 105. In order to close the recommendations, ITSRR is verifying whether RailCorp's Board has actively sought assurances that RailCorp has an adequate and integrated safety management system (Recommendation 105).

Safety Reform

SCOI Final Report Recommendation 110(a)-(e)

This recommendation sought to create a position of Safety Reform Program Director to manage the safety reform program being undertaken by RailCorp and detailed various aspects of the duties that should be undertaken by this position. During the reporting quarter, ITSRR verified and closed this recommendation and its sub-elements.

Safety Regulation

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 111-120

These recommendations addressed the role of ITSRR in relation to safety regulation, the governance of ITSRR and the need for more explicit guidelines from ITSRR. All of these recommendations have been verified and closed in previous quarters.

Integrated Safety Management

SCOI Final Report Recommendations 121- 124

These recommendations advocated that a regulation be promulgated specifying the requirements of a safety management system (SMS) (Recommendation 121) and the steps RailCorp needs to take to ensure that its SMS is integrated (Recommendation 122 – 124).

The NTC is developing a national regulation specifying requirements of an accredited operator's SMS. The NTC anticipates circulating a final regulation for industry wide consultation in May 2006 with a model regulation anticipated for jurisdictions to adopt sometime in early 2007. The national regulation will be based on the National Accreditation Package (NAP). In the interim, ITSRR will mandate the NAP in NSW from 30 June 2006 (Recommendation 121).

During the reporting period ITSRR closed and verified:

- That RailCorp had established an integrated safety management system which includes development of risk management procedures, including:
 - analysis of the nature of the activities being undertaken;
 - identification of all potential hazards within those activities;
 - analysis of the nature of the hazard;
 - analysis of the risks of the hazard materialising;
 - development of controls to mitigate the risk;
 - development of a continuing program to enhance the development of safe practices at all levels of the organisation; and
 - development of training systems, based upon training needs analysis (Recommendation 122 f parts (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vii) and (xii)).

In the next quarter ITSRR will continue verification of the remaining sub-elements of this recommendation (Recommendation 122 a – f).

ITSRR has verified that RailCorp's SMS includes the 29 elements identified by the SCOI (Recommendation 123). ITSRR has audited RailCorp against these elements and will do so in the future as part of its scheduled audit program (Recommendation 124).

Recommendations 123 & 124 were verified and closed during previous quarters.

Summary

Implementation of the NSW Government's response to the SCOI Final Report into the Waterfall rail accident must be seen in the context of systemic safety reform. As recognised by the Commissioner, there are no quick fixes.

The public reporting process associated with the Quarterly Reports on the implementation progress of the NSW Government's response sharpens both industry and public focus on rail safety. With 110 (62%) recommendations closed, 33 (19%) recommendations claimed for closure and a further 13 (7%)

recommendations scheduled for implementation by the end of the 2006 calendar year, bringing the total number due for completion by the end of 2006 to 156 (88%), substantial progress has been made since the release of the Report just over 1 year ago.

Rail safety in NSW requires a comprehensive approach to achieve fundamental and long lasting change to reduce the likelihood of accidents like the one at Waterfall from occurring again in the future. In light of this, ITSRR will continue to report on progress towards full implementation of the NSW Government's response to the Special Commission of Inquiry into the Waterfall Accident. Once recommendations have been closed, ITSRR will continue to monitor the ongoing compliance of the recommendations through its audit and inspection program.

APPENDIX 1 – TABLES AND GRAPHS

This table lists the recommendations for which each agency is responsible:

TABLE 1: RECOMMENDATIONS BY RESPONSIBLE AGENCY

RESPONSIBLE AGENCY	RECOMMENDATIONS FROM SCOI FINAL REPORT	NUMBER OF RECOMMENDATIONS INCLUDING SUB-ELEMENTS
RailCorp	1-8, 10-14, 16-20, 22, 25-27, 32, 34(a) – (h), 40, 47-53, 56, 58-62, 65-71, 83(a)-(n), 85-88, 96, 102-110(a)-(e), 122(a)-(f(i-xii)), 123,	103
Emergency Services Agencies	15, 97	2
Emergency Services Agencies & RailCorp	9, 21, 23, 24, 28	5
ITSRR	29, 30, 31, 33, 36-39, 41-46, 54-55, 57(a)-(i), 63-64, 75-80, 84, 89-95, 98-101, 113-117, 119-121, 124-125(a)-(b), 126	57
OTSI	72, 73, 74, 81, 82	5
Not assigned	35, 111, 112, 118, 127	5
TOTAL	127	177


At the end of the first quarter 2006, the status of the 177 Recommendations including sub-elements of the SCOI Final Report is detailed in the following table:

TABLE 2: STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS INCLUDING SUB-ELEMENTS AS AT 31 MARCH 2006

Operator	Open - Awaiting Response	Open-Response Received	Open - Acceptable Response	Open - Acceptable Alternate Response	Open-Response Rejected	Open - Company Claims Closure	Closed - Recommendation Rejected	Closed - N/A	Closed - Action Verified	Closed - Action Not verified	Total
Not Assigned							5				5
RailCorp			9			33			61		103
Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator			23						34		57
Office of Transport Safety Investigation								1	4		5
NSW Emergency Services									2		2
RailCorp/ NSW Emergency Services			2						3		5
TOTAL	0	0	34	0	0	33	5	1	104	0	177

The graph below illustrates the recommendations according to their respective status.

GRAPH 2: CURRENT STATUS OF AGGREGATE RECOMMENDATIONS INCLUDING SUB-ELEMENTS AS AT 31 MARCH 2006.



In the SCOI Final Report recommendations were listed against specific themes or topics relating to the causal factors associated with the Waterfall Rail Accident. The following table presents the status of recommendations by these themes:

TABLE 3: STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS BY THEME AS AT 31 MARCH 2006

Theme	Open - Awaiting Response	Open - Response Received	Open - Acceptable Response	Open - Acceptable Alternative Response	Open - Response Rejected by ITSRR	Open - Company Claims Closure	Closed Recommendation Rejected	Closed - No Longer Applicable	Closed Action Verified	Closed - Action Not Verified	Total
Emergency response 1-28	0	0	3	0	0	8	0	0	17	0	28
Procurement & design of rolling stock 29-30	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Driver safety systems 31-33	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3
Risk assessment and control procedures 34-35	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	8	0	9
Data loggers 36-37	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Communications 38-46	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	9
Train Maintenance 47-53	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	4	0	7
Alcohol and Drug Testing 54-56	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	3
Periodic Medical Examinations 57	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	9
Safety Document Control 58-64	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	4	0	7
Train Driver and Guard Training 65-71	0	0	3	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	7
Rail Accident Investigation 72-82	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	10	0	11
Safety Culture 83-84	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	0	15
OH&S 85-87	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	3
Passenger safety 88-101	0	0	10	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	14
Corporate Governance 102-109	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	4	0	8
Safety Reform 110	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	5
Safety Regulation 111-120	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	7	0	10
Integrated Safety Management 121-124	0	0	1	0	0	11	0	0	9	0	21
Implementation of Recommendations 125-127	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	3	0	4

APPENDIX 2 – METHODOLOGY

This section outlines the processes which ITSRR has instituted to develop and monitor the Implementation Plan for the Government's response to the SCOI Final Report into the Waterfall Rail Accident.

Implementation Plan

ITSRR has reviewed the SCOI Final Report and determined action required to implement each recommendation in line with the Government's response and which company or agency has responsibility for that action. These expectations then formed the basis for determining whether the response put forward by a company or agency is appropriate to meet the recommendation and/or satisfy the safety objective of the recommendation. Responsible agencies have assigned indicative timeframes for each safety action and ITSRR will review the appropriateness of each. Timeframes agreed with responsible companies or agencies have, to the greatest extent possible, been made realistic and achievable. Details of the Implementation Plan and progress against it may be found in Appendix 3 at page 49.

Classification System for Recommendations

In order to provide a graduated view of progress against the Implementation Plan, ITSRR has developed a classification system to indicate the relative status of each recommendation. The taxonomy for the Classification System has been drawn from accepted international practice and is listed in Table 5 at page 50 below.

The process for assigning status to a recommendation is as follows:

Step 1 The Government's response to the SCOI Final Report determined which recommendations were accepted. ITSRR has articulated its expectations in regards to all remaining recommendations.

- Step 2 All accepted recommendations are assigned the status "Open - Await Response". These recommendations are then referred by ITSRR to the relevant company or agency to prepare a response to the recommendation(s) and submit it to ITSRR.
- Step 3 ITSRR reviews the response and determines whether it is acceptable or not. If it is acceptable then the status of the recommendation is assigned either "Open - Acceptable Response" or "Open - Acceptable Alternative Response". A recommendation would be assigned an "Open - Acceptable Alternative Response" status when the intent of a recommendation will be met but will be implemented by alternative means. If the response is not acceptable then the recommendation is assigned the status of "Open - Response Rejected". In this case, the company or agency is informed of the decision and requested to re-submit a revised response taking into account ITSRR's concerns. This process continues until the response to the recommendation is accepted by ITSRR.
- Step 4 ITSRR monitors progress of all accepted responses to ensure a company or agency is meeting agreed implementation timeframes. This is done through both desktop reviews of reports received by agencies and in-field inspections to verify progress claimed.
- Step 5 Once a company or agency has completed a required action it will submit to ITSRR a claim for closure of the recommendation. This application indicates that the company or agency believes it has completed the required action. The status of the recommendation is changed to "Open – Company Claims Closure".
- Step 6 In most cases, ITSRR will verify closure through an in field compliance inspection or audit. Once verification has taken

place the recommendation status is changed to indicate it is "Closed - Verified".

This process will continue until all recommendations are closed.

TABLE 4: TAXONOMY FOR CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM

	STATUS	DEFINITION
1.	Open – Await Response	This status is automatically assigned to an accepted recommendation. Affected parties will be asked to submit their response for implementing the recommendation to ITSRR.
2.	Open – Response Received	ITSRR has received a response from an affected party and this response is under review by ITSRR. It has not yet been accepted by ITSRR.
3.	Open – Acceptable Response	ITSRR agrees that the planned action, when completed, meets the recommendation.
4.	Open – Acceptable Alternative Response	ITSRR agrees that alternative action, when completed, satisfies the objective of the recommendation.
5.	Open – Response Rejected by ITSRR	ITSRR does not agree that the planned or alternate action meets the recommendation. The company or agency is advised of the rejection and requested to provide a revised response.
6.	Open – Company Claims Closure	The company or agency claims that the planned or alternate action has been completed. The action has not yet been verified by ITSRR. ITSRR has not yet agreed that the item is closed.
7.	Closed – Recommendation Rejected	ITSRR has determined through further analysis and review that the recommendation is not appropriate (i.e. will not achieve the desired safety outcomes) and has rejected the recommendation. It is therefore closed.

8.	Closed – No Longer Applicable	The recommendation has been overtaken by events and action is no longer required. For example, a new technology has eliminated the reason for the recommendation, it has been superseded by other recommendations issued, or the operator affected has gone out of business.
9.	Closed – Action Verified	Completion of the planned or alternate action has been verified by ITSRR through a compliance inspection or audit.
10.	Closed – Action Not Verified	ITSRR accepts that the planned or alternate action has been completed following a review of documentation submitted. Field verification is not necessary.

RailCorp & Other Rail Operators

The SCOI Final Report primarily focused on RailCorp and actions required by it to improve safety as a consequence of the Waterfall Rail Accident. In quarterly reports therefore, ITSRR will report on recommendations specific to RailCorp. However, some recommendations from the Final Report may also be relevant to other rail operators in NSW. In light of this, ITSRR has reviewed the recommendations and identified where other rail operators may also be required to improve safety operations.

Where recommendations have applicability to the wider rail industry, ITSRR will report on progress of its own actions to ensure other operators also meet the intent of SCOI recommendations and on any general areas of concern about implementation issues across the industry. Progress on specific safety actions by other rail operators will not be reported upon in ITSRR quarterly reports.

ITSRR

ITSRR is also responsible for implementing recommendations from the SCOI Final Report. These quarterly reports will assess progress made by ITSRR on those recommendations. The same methodology as outlined above will be used to assess the implementation status of recommendations for which ITSRR is responsible. ITSRR has established an internal process between Divisions which allows for an independent assessment of whether recommendations are being implemented according to the Implementation Plan and to ensure status reports accurately reflect progress against the Plan. The Chief Executive must sign off on all completed actions before a recommendation is closed.

Other Agencies

ITSRR has held meetings with the Office of Emergency Services and the Office of Transport Safety Investigation (OTSI) to review and discuss the implementation and reporting of recommendations under their responsibility. Review of responses from these agencies will also follow the process outlined above and will be reported quarterly. ITSRR has agreed to timeframes and actions with each of these agencies.

APPENDIX 3 – IMPLEMENTATION PLAN: OUTSTANDING RECOMMENDATIONS

NB: This table lists only the recommendations which were closed in the last quarter, or remain to be implemented. Those recommendations closed in previous quarters do not appear. A complete list of all recommendations is contained in the First Report, on ITSRR's website at: <http://www.transportregulator.nsw.gov.au>

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
1. Staff at the Rail Management Centre (RMC) should receive training from RailCorp to enable them to quickly and accurately assess that an emergency has occurred and to provide precise and reliable information to emergency response personnel about the location of the emergency, the available access to the site and the resources necessary.	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp to provide: a) Evidence of Development of Training Program that addresses issues identified in the SCOI.(Includes Development Process, Training Aids / Curriculum). b) Evidence of Appropriate Assessment Competency. (Delivery of course by appropriately qualified trainers.) c) Evidence of process to ensure the training of new staff and the Refresher training of existing staff. d) Review process built-in, to take into account relevance and changes.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/03/2006
4. The RMC should be equipped by RailCorp with a transcriber system, or mimic board, or such other system as is necessary to enable identification of the precise location at any time of any train on the RailCorp network.	Supported in principle. The RMC is equipped with a network mimic panel that currently gives train visibility on approximately 65% of the RailCorp network. Visibility of approximately 90% is targeted for 2008. RailCorp will conduct a study of other options available, including	RailCorp to provide a detailed program to explain how the trains will be located on a board, or similar, in the RMC. Recognising that this will require some Capital expenditure, it is expected that the program will be a funded program with timelines. Functionality is to include a requirement to enable	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/03/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
	GPS technology to provide a more precise location at any time of all operators' trains on the RailCorp network.	trains to be readily identified, as a minimum. Compliance review (i.e. Current coverage of network, e.g. does it cover 65%.) Review existence planning / funding (r.e. 90% coverage 2008.) Existence of plans / project to review options available.				
5. All train guards should be trained by RailCorp in the use, of the MetroNet radio and instructed to use it in any emergency.	The training of guards in the use of MetroNet radio is supported and being implemented. The use of MetroNet radio by guards in emergencies is supported in principle and RailCorp will review the operational and technical issues the recommendation raises.	RailCorp to provide details of the training program that demonstrates that Guards are trained in the use of MetroNet and know how to use the system in an emergency. The program is to include: a) Evidence of Development of Training Program that addresses issues. (Includes Development Process, Training Aids / Curriculum.) b) Evidence of Appropriate Assessment Competency.(Delivery of course by appropriately qualified trainers.) c) Evidence of process to ensure the training of new staff and the Refresher training of existing staff. d) Review process built-in, to take into account relevance and changes. e) Ensure guard has access to communications. f) Assess Project Plan for Implementation.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/01/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
6. Procedures should be put in place by RailCorp to ensure that electrical power supply to the area of an accident can be immediately isolated, if necessary, in the event of a rail injury or harm.	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp to demonstrate that appropriate procedures have been established and that all appropriate staff have been trained in the procedures. The overall program is to demonstrate that procedures have been developed, with appropriate consultation. Project to include: a) Evidence of Development of Training Program that addresses issues. (Includes Development Process, Training Aids / Curriculum.) b) Evidence of Appropriate Assessment Competency.(Delivery of course by appropriately qualified trainers.) c) Evidence of process to ensure the training of new staff and the Refresher training of existing staff. d) Review process built-in, to take into account relevance and changes. e) Ensure that the procedures are included in Incident Plans.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/10/2005
8. All signal telephones must be maintained by RailCorp in proper working order.	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp to demonstrate that a suitable inspection, fault rectification and maintenance plan is in place. The Maintenance Plan is to include: - process for reporting faults. - process for responding to faults. - preventative maintenance.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/10/2005

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
9. All emergency services stations should be provided with access keys to, and maps showing, all gates providing access to RailCorp tracks within their geographic area of responsibility.	Supported in principle subject to discussion between RailCorp and emergency services regarding operational and security issues.	Item requires an agreement between RailCorp and Emergency Services in place on most effective means of access to information to facilitate immediate access to emergency site agreement with emergency services. RailCorp to demonstrate that details are included in the Incident Management Plans.	RailCorp and NSW Emergency Services	Open	Acceptable Response	30/06/2006
10. A railway disaster plan, or rail displan, should be developed by RailCorp and the emergency services to ensure co-ordinated inter-agency response to rail accidents and incidents on the RailCorp network.	Supported in principle and being implemented through other means. The State Emergency Management Committee advises a specific sub plan for rail would not provide additional response capability and it would not be consistent with the all Hazards approach. Instead the Commissioner's recommendations below about a specific Railway Disaster Plan will be incorporated in the overall State Disaster Plan (Displan) and RailCorp's Incident Management Framework. This Framework addresses all level of rail incidents including 'emergencies' and will be implemented early 2005.	That a joint or jointly developed plan is produced by the Agencies. The details of the plan are top include, amongst other things: immediate response, site management and recovery processes. Also requires the development of: - Comprehensive Incident Management Plans/Procedures. - Development of Network Incident Management plan with ARTC RailCorp (Track Manager). - Training Issues to ensure that staff can implement.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	+ 31/07/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
15. The location of the command post for site control at the scene of any rail accident should be identified by NSW Police by a distinctive flashing light	Supported and being implemented.	That a joint or jointly developed plan is produced by the Agencies. The details of the plan are to include, amongst other things: immediate response, site management and recovery processes. Also requires the development of: - Comprehensive Incident Management Plans/Procedures. - Development of Network Incident Management plan with RailCorp (Track Manager). - Training Issues to ensure that staff can implement. Detail also in include: - Emergency Service Action - Implementation of distinctive identification of command post.	NSW Emergency Services	Closed		31/03/2006
18. RailCorp should develop and implement an emergency response plan for management of all rail accidents. Such a plan should be subsumed by the rail displan in the case of serious accidents or incidents.	Supported and being implemented through the RailCorp Incident Management Framework. The RailCorp Incident Management Framework was developed in consultation with emergency service agencies and it aligns with the State Disaster Plan	That a joint or jointly developed plan is produced by the Agencies. The details of the plan are to include, amongst other things: immediate response, site management and recovery processes. Also requires the development of: - Comprehensive Incident Management Plans/Procedures. - Development of Network Incident Management plan with RailCorp (Track Manager). - Training Issues to ensure that staff can implement.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	+ 31/07/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
<p>19. The RailCorp emergency response plan should include action checklists of the steps that each employee is required to take, and the order for specific employees to follow in case of emergency.</p>	<p>Supported and being implemented through the Incident Management Framework.</p>	<p>That a joint or jointly developed plan is produced by the Agencies. The details of the plan are to include, amongst other things: immediate response, site management and recovery processes. Also requires the development of: - Comprehensive Incident Management Plans/Procedures.- Development of Network Incident Management plan with RailCorp (Track Manager).- Training Issues to ensure that staff can implement will be covered in Recommendation 20.- Development / Implementation of checklists. Distribution of the checklists and alignment with the staff training and emergency exercises.</p>	<p>RailCorp</p>	<p>Closed</p>		<p>31/10/2005</p>
<p>20. All operational rail staff should be trained by RailCorp in the action check list relevant to each.</p>	<p>Supported.</p>	<p>That a joint or jointly developed plan is produced by the Agencies. The details of the plan are to include, amongst other things: immediate response, site management and recovery processes. Also requires the development of: - Comprehensive Incident Management Plans/Procedures.- Development of Network Incident Management plan with</p>	<p>RailCorp</p>	<p>Open</p>	<p>Acceptable Response</p>	<p>30/06/2006</p>

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
		RailCorp (Track Manager).- Training Issues to ensure that staff can implement.- Development / Implementation of checklists- Distribution of the checklists and alignment with the staff training and emergency exercises. To ensure that training requirements met under Recommendation 3 namely, RailCorp to provide: a) Evidence of Development of Training Program that addresses issues (includes Development Process, Training Aids / Curriculum); b) Evidence of Appropriate Assessment Competency. Delivery of course by appropriately qualified trainers; c) Evidence of process to ensure the training of new staff and the Refresher training of existing staff; d) Review process built-in, to take into account relevance and changes; e) Evidence of Training of Skills assessment; f) Evidence of responsibilities in PD; g) Evidence of responsibilities reflected in plan. To ensure that staff can implement emergency procedures in respect of Recommendations: 11 (use by all emergency response				

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
		<p>personnel of a uniform incident command system); 12 (appointment of a rail emergency management co-ordinator at the RMC, and an on-site rail commander); 13 (Site Controller to have complete control of the site & the Rail Commander must report to this position); 14 (Incident Command System has clearly identified roles and that a joint or jointly developed plan is produced by the Agencies); 16 (rail commander should provide support and assistance to the site controller and emergency services personnel); 17 (The rail commander should have complete authority to direct and control all response personnel from rail organisations); 19 (The RailCorp emergency response plan should include action checklists of the steps that each employee is required to take, and the order for specific employees to follow in case of emergency.</p>				
<p>21. The RailCorp emergency response plan should be provided to all emergency response agencies. The officers of each emergency service should be trained in any rail specific features</p>	<p>Supported in principle and being implemented through other means. The RailCorp Incident Management Framework will be given to all emergency response</p>	<p>The training program needs to be managed and implemented jointly by the Emergency Services and RailCorp. Details of the implementation program should include: - Existence of</p>	<p>RailCorp and NSW Emergency Services</p>	<p>Closed</p>		<p>31/03/2006</p>

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
<p>of the plan, so as to better ensure inter-agency co-ordination in the circumstances of an emergency.</p>	<p>agencies. In addition, RailCorp has provided access to emergency services to railway equipment for training purposes. RailCorp has also produced a DVD covering rail specific emergency response matters for use by the emergency services for training their staff. 500 DVDs have been given to each of Fire Services, Ambulance and Police. Emergency services personnel will be trained in rail hazard awareness using material provided by RailCorp. The very large number of emergency response personnel (including volunteer services) that may respond to a rail incident, means training of all personnel in the RailCorp Framework is unlikely to be achievable. Emergency Services will investigate with RailCorp extension of the DVD into a multimedia resource to improve the ability to educate wider numbers of emergency service workers.</p>	<p>Comprehensive Incident Management Plans/Procedures. Development of Network Incident Management plan with RailCorp (Track Manager). - Training Issues. - Liaison communication with Emergency Services. - The RailCorp Incident report framework needs to be provided to Emergency services. Emergency services to determine how best and who to train in the Incident Management framework.</p>				

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
<p>23. All emergency response personnel should be specifically trained in the features of railways which are relevant to their work, such as the location and means of operation of all emergency door releases on trains, the location and use of signal telephones, the methods by which electrical power can be isolated and the means by which they can readily identify and obtain information from the on-site rail commander.</p>	<p>Supported in principle and being implemented through other means. See R 21.</p>	<p>The training program needs to be managed and implemented jointly by the Emergency Services and RailCorp. Details of the implementation program should include: - Existence of Comprehensive Incident Management Plans/Procedures. - Development of Network Incident Management plan with RailCorp (Track Manager). - Training Issues. - Liaison communication with Emergency Services. - The RailCorp Incident report framework needs to be provided to Emergency services. Emergency services to determine how best and who to train in the Incident Management framework. - Appropriate agreements/arrangements in place between Rail Operators and Emergency Services.</p>	<p>RailCorp and NSW Emergency Services</p>	<p>Closed</p>		<p>31/03/2006</p>
<p>25. Uniform verbal descriptions identifying that power has been isolated should be developed by RailCorp and utilised by all railway personnel, electrical service providers and all emergency response personnel.</p>	<p>Supported and being implemented.</p>	<p>RailCorp to provide: Procedures Developed (Including Appropriate Consultation Development.) a) Evidence of Development of Training Program that addresses issues. (Includes Development Process, Training Aids / Curriculum.) b) Evidence of Appropriate Assessment Competency. (Delivery of</p>	<p>RailCorp</p>	<p>Open</p>	<p>Agency Claims Closure</p>	<p>31/10/2005</p>

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
		course by appropriately qualified trainers.) c) Evidence of process to ensure the training of new staff and the Refresher training of existing staff. d) Review process built-in, to take into account relevance and changes. e) Ensure included in Incident Management Plans.				
28. A training centre for emergency services personnel should be established by RailCorp. The emergency services personnel should be required to undertake training at such a centre, which should be equipped with features replicating railway infrastructure and rolling stock.	Supported and being implemented. An emergency services training facility is in place at Redfern with a platform, double decker carriage and blackout facilities. Petersham now nominated in place of Redfern	RailCorp and Emergency Services Agencies to review appropriateness and suitability of existing facilities. determine and implement these arrangements.	RailCorp and NSW Emergency Services	Open	Acceptable Response	+ TBA
29. All railway owners and operators should have a quality assurance program for the design and construction of rolling stock and regular review of construction to ensure that the rolling stock satisfies the original functional performance specifications.	Supported and being implemented.	ITSRR will ensure through its accreditation process that operators have detailed procedures for the design, construction and introduction of any new rolling stock.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	30/06/2006
30. The rail safety regulator should set standards for the design, manufacture, testing and commissioning of rolling stock to ensure that the rolling stock is fit for its purpose.	Supported in principle and being implemented through other means. ITSRR will introduce regulations including for rolling stock that set out the expectations (or performance outcomes) required of industry. The regulations will be developed	ITSRR will refer matter to NTC for development of National Regulation. In the interim, ITSRR will require operators, through the accreditation process to meet existing industry standards for rolling stock acquisition, including AS4292, rolling stock units,	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	* 30/09/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
	on a national basis, through the National Transport Commission process, to ensure consistent application across the Australian rail industry. Notwithstanding the expectation that industry will develop and maintain appropriate safety standards, ITSRR will retain the power to mandate such standards if the industry clearly fails to deliver satisfactory safety outcomes.	Train Operating Conditions and Industry technical codes.				
31. All trains must be fitted with a minimum of two independent engineering defences to minimise the risk of derailment or collision in the event of train driver incapacitation	Supported in principle for further review. ITSRR supports this for driver-only operations and will review its application on an industry-wide basis. It has been implemented on all RailCorp passenger trains. Driver safety systems and train protection systems are interrelated but may also be implemented independently. Recommendations 31-33 need to be reviewed in light of this relationship. All RailCorp passenger rollingstock have a minimum of two engineering defences (deadman, vigilance, trainstops) except 600 class (those operating in the	ITSRR currently requires through the existing accreditation process all driver-only trains (ie one person in the drivers cab) to be fitted with two independent engineering defences. ITSRR to develop and lead a review of the need for a second engineering defence in other trains. ITSRR to establish position following review.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Closed	Acceptable Alternative Response	30/01/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
	Hunter Valley) which will be replaced from the end of 2005 with rollingstock that complies with this requirement. In the meantime on 600 class, the train guard travels with the driver as added protection for driver incapacitation.					
32. RailCorp should progressively implement, within a reasonable time, level 2 automatic train protection with the features identified in chapter 8 of this report.	Requires further detailed review. The Government supports the implementation of additional train protection systems. Implementation of level 2 ATP as detailed in the recommendation would involve the replacement of all line-side signalling on the RailCorp network with on-train control systems. In addition every intra and inter-state train accessing the network would also need to be equipped with level 2 ATP technology. RailCorp has already retained consultants to undertake evaluation and risk assessment regarding implementation of additional automatic train protection systems on the RailCorp network. RailCorp will work with the Australian Rail Track Corporation (which	A detailed technical review of available options. This is to be a project lead by RailCorp. The major outcome of the project is to be a business case for Government concerning ATP.	RailCorp	Open	Acceptable Response	30/09/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
	operates the interstate network) to develop, in conjunction with ITSRR and interstate rail regulators, a national standard for an automatic train protection system. RailCorp will also undertake a comprehensive review which will include a risk assessment, technical feasibility and cost benefit analysis of introducing level 1 ATP as well as level 2 ATP, as recommended by the Commission. Consistent with recommendation 34 any future options will need to be assessed by independent verification of acceptable risk.					
33. All new rolling stock should be designed to be compatible with at least level 2 automatic train protection discussed in chapter 7 of this report. Risk assessment and risk control procedures.	Requires further detailed review. See R 32.	Recommendation incorporated into review that will be undertaken in response to Recommendation 32. ITSRR will refer matter to NTC for the development of regulation/standards for rolling stock.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	* 30/09/2006
34.a) Identify the features of the system, subsystem or activities that are to be risk assessed and managed, to determine what makes the system work in terms of equipment, infrastructure and human factors;	Supported and being implemented. RailCorp has undertaken the development of a Risk Management Framework, with the assistance of external safety experts. The draft Risk	RailCorp's new Risk Management framework will incorporate requirements Recommendation 34(a) to (h).	RailCorp	Closed		31/10/2005

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
	Management Framework will be assessed against Recommendations 34 (a) to (h) to ensure the Framework addresses them.					
34.b) identify all hazards that may exist within the particular system, subsystem or activity, whether it is a driver safety system, passenger safety system, engineering design system,, train maintenance system or involves human factors or performance;	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp's new Risk Management framework will incorporate requirements Recommendation 34(a) to (h).	RailCorp	Closed		31/10/2005
34.c) identify what controls are in place to eliminate or minimise the risks associated with any identified hazard;	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp's new Risk Management framework will incorporate requirements Recommendation 34(a) to (h).	RailCorp	Closed		31/10/2005
34.d) test the validity of the controls to ensure that the risk is eliminated or reduced to an acceptable level and, if not, institute additional or further control measures;	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp's new Risk Management framework will incorporate requirements Recommendation 34(a) to (h).	RailCorp	Closed		31/10/2005
34.e) specify, in safety documentation, the level of any residual risk	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp's new Risk Management framework will incorporate requirements Recommendation 34(a) to (h).	RailCorp	Closed		31/10/2005
34.f) in the case of low probability, high consequence risks retain the services of an independent verifier of the risk assessments and controls to certify that all risks of such potentially catastrophic accidents have either been eliminated, or controlled to the extent identified by the	Supported in principle for further review. RailCorp will investigate the availability of independent experts willing to undertake this certification role.	RailCorp's new Risk Management framework will incorporate requirements Recommendation 34(a) to (h).	RailCorp	Closed		31/10/2005

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
independent expert;						
34.g) the Board of RailCorp certify that it regards any residual risk of a high consequence, low probability accident as acceptable, notwithstanding the severity of the consequences, by reason of the cost of further measures to control the risk; and	Supported in principle and being implemented through other means The RailCorp Board is prepared to certify that the risk management processes designed to achieve this are in place.	RailCorp's new Risk Management framework will incorporate requirements Recommendation 34(a) to (h).	RailCorp	Closed		31/10/2005
34.h) provide to ITSRR records of the processes of hazard identification, risk assessment, risk control, independent verification and certification, and any Board certification relating to any high consequence, low probability accident.	Supported.	RailCorp's new Risk Management framework will incorporate requirements Recommendation 34(a) to (h).	RailCorp	Closed		31/10/2005
36. The ITSRR should impose a standard in relation to the collection and use of data from data loggers.	Supported in principle for implementation through other means. ITSRR will introduce regulations including for data loggers that set out the expectations (or performance outcomes) required of industry. The regulations will be developed on a national basis, through the National Transport Commission process, to ensure consistent application across the Australian rail industry. Notwithstanding the expectation that industry will develop and maintain appropriate safety	ITSRR will refer matter to NTC for development of National Regulation In the interim, ITSRR will review existing standards set in access agreements to ensure adequate standards for collection and use of data.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	* 30/09/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
	standards, ITSRR will retain the power to mandate such standards if the industry clearly fails to deliver satisfactory safety outcomes.					
37. The standard in relation to the collection and use of data from data loggers should provide that such information must be accessed in the circumstances of any accident or incident and can be accessed to monitor driver performance generally.	Supported in principle for implementation through other means. (See R 36) Information from data loggers can be accessed to monitor for any incident or accident and can be accessed to monitor a driver's performance generally.	ITSRR will refer matter to NTC for development of National Regulation ITSRR will adopt National Regulation In the interim, ITSRR will seek from RailCorp proposals to improve the monitoring of driver performance (especially for training purposes)	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	* 30/09/2006
38. There must be compatibility of communications systems throughout the rail network. It is essential that all train drivers, train controllers, signallers, train guards and supervisors of trackside work gangs in New South Wales be able to communicate using the same technology.	Supported and being implemented. The National Standing Committee of Transport endorsed the Australasian Railway Association working with operators and regulators, including RailCorp and ITSRR, to develop a national approach on communications systems, which has agreed minimum functionality requirements for train radio systems. RailCorp plans to implement a digital train radio system. An objective of this system is for it to be interoperable with existing analogue radio systems. Because of the	ITSRR to ensure functionality and compatibility requirements included in national standard, currently under development by the Australasian Railway Association. ITSRR to ensure RailCorp/ARTC Radio Functionality for next generation technology compatibility requirements.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	31/12/2010

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
	technical complexities associated with achieving inter-operability, this has been a longer-term initiative and the first stage of its implementation will commence in 2005.					
39. Communications procedures must be standardised throughout the rail network, so that all railway employees describe the same subject matter in an identical way.	Supported. RailCorp Network Procedures contain standardised communications procedures, which are in place across the NSW network. ITSRR will introduce regulations including for communications that set out the expectations (or performance outcomes) required of industry. The regulations will be developed on a national basis, through the National Transport Commission process, to ensure consistent application across the Australian rail industry.	ITSRR to ensure that standard communications procedures are included in Network rules. ITSRR to ensure that appropriate Training is provided by operator including: a) Evidence of Development of Training Program that addresses issues. (Includes Development Process, Training Aids / Curriculum.) b) Evidence of Appropriate Assessment Competency. (Delivery of course by appropriately qualified trainers.) c) Evidence of process to ensure the training of new staff and the Refresher training of existing staff. d) Review process built-in, to take into account relevance and changes. ITSRR will refer matter to the NTC for development of National regulations.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	* 30/09/2006
43. Communications protocols and procedures should be standardised. and mandated by regulations making them a	Supported. As for R 39.	ITSRR will refer matter to NTC for development of National Regulation ITSRR will adopt National Regulation. In the	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability	Open	Acceptable Response	* 30/09/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
condition of accreditation.		interim, ITSRR will enforce compliance with the current protocols through its accreditation, audit and compliance activities.	Regulator			
46. There should be interoperability of communications equipment between all trains operating on the New South Wales rail network.	Supported and being implemented. Interoperability is defined in terms of the driver having one hand-set with interfaces to allow communications with the appropriate operating personnel. It does not imply a single all-users radio system. The National Standing Committee of Transport endorsed the Australasian Railway Association working with operators and regulators, including RailCorp and ITSRR, to develop a national approach on communications systems, which has agreed minimum functionality requirements for train radio systems. RailCorp plans to implement a digital train radio system. An objective of this system is for it to be interoperable with existing analogue radio systems. Because of the technical complexities associated with achieving	ITSRR to ensure compatibility requirements included in national standard currently being developed by the ARA. ITSRR to ensure RailCorp/ARTC Radio Functionality for next generation technology addresses compatibility requirements. In the interim ITSRR will mandate through regulation the requirement for train radio communications equipment that allows communication between all trains operating on the NSW network in an emergency situation.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Closed		31/03/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
	inter-operability, this has been a longer-term initiative and. the first stage of its implementation will commence in 2005.					
48. All train drivers' defects reports should be entered by RailCorp into a computerised record and tracked to finalisation.	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp to have effective procedures and database to ensure all defects reports are entered and tracked to finalisation.	RailCorp	Closed		30/06/2005
50. All reported train defects should be certified by a person in a supervisory position in RailCorp as having been rectified.	Supported and being implemented. a supervisory position in RailCorp as having been rectified.	RailCorp to have identified an appropriate position to sign off train defects that have been rectified. RailCorp to have implemented procedures to support and implement process.	RailCorp	Open	Acceptable Response	30/09/2006
52. Maintenance plans on all trains should be revised annually.	Supported in principle for further review. All maintenance plans are being reviewed. RailCorp will incorporate this recommendation in that review.	All plans reviewed. Process to ensure regular / appropriate reviews take place	RailCorp	Open	Acceptable Response	31/12/2006
53. Train inspections should be carried out at the time of stabling RailCorp trains, as well as a part of train preparation prior to entering service.	Supported in principle for further review. RailCorp is reviewing procedures and resources to rectify defects. RailCorp provides time for drivers of stabling trains to report any noted defect.	A document risk assessment and/or business case by RailCorp, detailing how train integrity on entering into service is to be managed.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/10/2005
55. Alcohol and drug testing should be mandatory for any train driver or guard involved in any accident or incident.	Supported. ITSRR will review this recommendation as part of its ongoing involvement in checking Drug & Alcohol Programs of	ITSRR to develop guideline on when/which accidents/incidents require mandatory testing.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	30/04/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
	rail operators. RailCorp currently tests randomly for drugs and alcohol and allows for drug and alcohol testing to be undertaken for safety-related accidents and incidents.					
57.d) all such medical examinations must be reviewed on behalf of the employer by an occupational physician.	Supported. ITSRR will submit this recommendation to the National Transport Commission (NTC) for consideration as part of the National Standard.	ITSRR will submit recommendation to NTC for consideration in context of current standard	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	* 30/06/2006
57.e) appropriate follow up examinations, such as a stress ECG or examination by a cardiologist, must be arranged for any safety critical employee whom the occupational physician believes may be at risk of sudden incapacitation	Supported. ITSRR will submit this recommendation to the National Transport Commission for consideration as part of the National Standard.	ITSRR will submit recommendation to NTC for consideration in context of current standard	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	* 30/06/2006
57.f) medical histories of employees should be monitored by an occupational physician to enable identification of any trends that may indicate a deteriorating state of health	Supported in principle and being implemented through other means. The standard requires follow-up examinations to be arranged for safety critical workers whom the examining doctor (AHP) believes may be at risk of sudden incapacitation. *Note The Health Assessment Standards refer to an Authorised Health Professional, who is not necessarily an occupational	ITSRR will submit recommendation to NTC for consideration in context of current standard.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	* 30/06/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
	physician but is a doctor who has received the appropriate training.					
58. RailCorp should establish a comprehensive safety document management system	Supported.	RailCorp Safety Document Management System to be Implemented which incorporates recommendation 59-62.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/10/2005
59. The safety document management system should provide for the distribution of electronic versions of safety documentation to relevant staff.	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp Safety Document Management System provides for the distribution of electronic versions of safety documentation to relevant staff.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/10/2005
61. RailCorp should provide access to electronic versions of safety documentation for all operational staff at their workplace.	Supported in principle for further review. RailCorp is reviewing options for providing all staff with the best and appropriate means of accessing safety documentation, including by electronic means.	The Rail Safety Document Management System ensures the distribution of electronic versions of safety documentation to relevant staff. Procedures in place so that all operational staff can access safety documentation at appropriate times.	RailCorp	Open	Acceptable Response	30/06/2006
65. Recommendations one to seven of the final report of the Special Commission of Inquiry into the Glenbrook Rail Accident should be fully implemented, save that the random auditing referred to in recommendations five and seven should be carried out by ITSRR	Supported and being implemented. ITSRR and RailCorp will review the implementation of all the seven recommendations in light of the Waterfall Inquiry.	RailCorp to conduct an Audit review of Recommendations 1-7 of Glenbrook report. RailCorp to develop an overall training development program based on competences identified in Glenbrook Recommendations 1-7. This is expected to deal with training related issues identified in recommendations from SCOI/Glenbrook.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/07/2005

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
66. RailCorp should use its simulators in an interactive manner.	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp to provide: a) Evidence of Development of Training Program that addresses issues. (Includes Development Process, Training Aids / Curriculum.) b) Evidence of Appropriate Assessment Competency.(Delivery of course by appropriately qualified trainers.) c) Evidence of process to ensure the training of new staff and the Refresher training of existing staff. d) Review process built-in, to take into account relevance and changes.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	30/06/2005
67. RailCorp should use its simulators to train drivers and guards in methods of dealing with degraded operations on the rail network.	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp to provide: a) Evidence of Development of Training Program that addresses issues in recommendations 66-70 (Includes Development Process, Training Aids / Curriculum.) b) Evidence of Appropriate Assessment Competency.(Delivery of course by appropriately qualified trainers.) c) Evidence of process to ensure the training of new staff and the Refresher training of existing staff. d) Review process built-in, to take into account relevance and changes.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	30/06/2005

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
68. Train driver and guard training should encourage teamwork and discourage authority gradients.	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp to provide: a) Evidence of Development of Training Program that addresses issues in recommendations 66-70 (Includes Development Process, Training Aids / Curriculum.) b) Evidence of Appropriate Assessment Competency.(Delivery of course by appropriately qualified trainers.) c) Evidence of process to ensure the training of new staff and the Refresher training of existing staff. d) Review process built-in, to take into account relevance and changes.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/07/2005

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
69. RailCorp must establish a task analysis for particular categories of employees, to identify the specific skills and responsibility of those employees or groups of employees, and thereafter undertake a training needs analysis, to develop the skills required in particular areas.	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp to provide: a) Evidence of Development of Training Program that addresses issues in recommendations 66-70 (Includes Development Process, Training Aids / Curriculum.) b) Evidence of Appropriate Assessment Competency.(Delivery of course by appropriately qualified trainers.) c) Evidence of process to ensure the training of new staff and the Refresher training of existing staff. d) Review process built-in, to take into account relevance and changes.	RailCorp	Open	Acceptable Response	30/06/2006
70. Training should be based upon a needs analysis, to determine what skills a particular person will require to carry out the tasks of any position safely and efficiently, and instruction and practice, to acquire and demonstrate those skills.	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp to provide evidence of a corporate system to identify skills development requirements based on a needs analysis.	RailCorp	Open	Acceptable Response	31/12/2006
71. The position of team leader should be created by RailCorp to be responsible for a group of approximately 30 train drivers, with responsibility to ensure that each train driver's training needs are being met and that any safety concerns of train drivers are being properly addressed. The team	Supported in principle for further review. RailCorp is reviewing the current supervisory structure of train crewing in light of this recommendation.	Creation of appropriate position to carry out functions outlined in Rec 71.	RailCorp	Open	Acceptable Response	30/09/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
leaders are to have direct access to the Chief Executive of RailCorp if any safety concerns they have are not addressed						
83.a) RailCorp should develop a plan to be submitted to ITSRR to address the deficiencies in the safety culture of RailCorp, including: a) the means whereby RailCorp proposes to ensure that all its operational, administrative and managerial staff consider the safety implications of any decision or action undertaken by them	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp to develop safety culture program which incorporates recommendation 83 (a) - (n).	RailCorp	Closed		31/10/2005
83.b) the means whereby any distrust between management and operational staff is removed and replaced by a culture in which the whole organisation is motivated towards the safe conduct of its transportation activities.	The RailCorp safety culture program will be reviewed to ensure compliance with this recommendation.	RailCorp to develop safety culture program which incorporates recommendation 83 (a) - (n).	RailCorp	Closed		31/10/2005
83.c) the means whereby RailCorp proposes to implement a just culture instead of a blame culture;	The RailCorp safety culture program will be reviewed to ensure compliance with this recommendation.	RailCorp to develop safety culture program which incorporates recommendation 83 (a) - (n).	RailCorp	Closed		31/10/2005
83.d) the means whereby RailCorp proposes to establish and implement accountability and responsibility of individuals for the safety of the activities that they undertake;	The RailCorp safety culture program will be reviewed to ensure compliance with this recommendation.	RailCorp to develop safety culture program which incorporates recommendation 83 (a) - (n).	RailCorp	Closed		31/10/2005
83.e) the means whereby RailCorp proposes to measure the safety performance of all individuals with accountabilities and responsibilities	The RailCorp safety culture program will be reviewed to ensure compliance with this recommendation.	RailCorp to develop safety culture program which incorporates recommendation 83 (a) - (n).	RailCorp	Closed		31/10/2005

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
for safety, for the purpose of determining whether their level of safety performance is satisfactory;						
83.f) the means whereby the Board of Directors, the Chief Executive and the Group General Managers intend, by their actions and behaviour, to foster the development of a safety culture in the organisation;	The RailCorp safety culture program will be reviewed to ensure compliance with this recommendation.	RailCorp to develop safety culture program which incorporates recommendation 83 (a) - (n).	RailCorp	Closed		31/10/2005
83.g) the means whereby RailCorp proposes to reward employees for bringing safety issues to the attention of management, and the means whereby the management of the organisation proposes to track the safety issues raised, to ensure continual safety improvement;	The RailCorp safety culture program will reviewed to ensure compliance with this recommendation.	RailCorp to develop safety culture program which incorporates recommendation 83 (a) - (n).	RailCorp	Closed		31/10/2005
83.h) the means, generally, whereby RailCorp intends to replace the present culture of on-time running with a culture encouraging safe, efficient and reliable provision of rail services.	The RailCorp safety culture program will reviewed to ensure compliance with this recommendation.	RailCorp to develop safety culture program which incorporates recommendation 83 (a) - (n).	RailCorp	Closed		31/10/2005
83. i) the means whereby RailCorp proposes to ensure that	The RailCorp safety culture program will reviewed to	RailCorp to develop safety culture program which	RailCorp	Closed		31/10/2005

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
communications protocols are followed by the employees of the RMC and all other employees engaged in safety critical work	ensure compliance with this recommendation.	incorporates recommendation 83 (a) - (n).				
83. j) the means whereby RailCorp proposes to set safety targets for the reduction of incidents overall, and incidents in particular classes, and the means whereby the relevant information is to be kept and collated for the purpose of measuring safety performance in those areas	The RailCorp safety culture program will reviewed to ensure compliance with this recommendation.	RailCorp to develop safety culture program which incorporates recommendation 83 (a) - (n).	RailCorp	Closed		31/10/2005
83.k) the means whereby employees responsible for particular areas are rewarded for safety improvements in their areas of activity;	The RailCorp safety culture program will reviewed to ensure compliance with this recommendation.	RailCorp to develop safety culture program which incorporates recommendation 83 (a) - (n).	RailCorp	Closed		31/10/2005
83.l) the means whereby RailCorp intends to integrate safety in all aspects and at all levels of the transportation activities which it undertakes	The RailCorp safety culture program will reviewed to ensure compliance with this recommendation.	RailCorp to develop safety culture program which incorporates recommendation 83 (a) - (n).	RailCorp	Closed		31/10/2005
83.m) the means whereby RailCorp proposes to train staff in processes of hazard analysis and risk management relevant to the particular activities that they conduct; and	The RailCorp safety culture program will reviewed to ensure compliance with this recommendation.	RailCorp to develop safety culture program which incorporates recommendation 83 (a) - (n).	RailCorp	Closed		31/10/2005
83.n) the means whereby RailCorp is to integrate the management of safety in all aspects into the general management of its business undertaking.	The RailCorp safety culture program will reviewed to ensure compliance with this recommendation.	RailCorp to develop safety culture program which incorporates recommendation 83 (a) - (n).	RailCorp	Closed		31/10/2005

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
84. If ITSRR accepts such a plan as an appropriate response to the existing weak safety culture, ITSRR should approve it and monitor the effectiveness of the plan.	Supported in principle. ITSRR is reviewing the process used to develop the Plan. ITSRR will also review the Plan as submitted and monitor its effectiveness.	ITSRR reviews RailCorp's plan and assess whether it incorporates recommendation 83(a) - (n) ITSRR monitors implementation of plan.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Closed		31/12/2005
85. RailCorp's approach to occupational health and safety should be proactive and involve the systematic analysis of all current hazards, risks and controls and an assessment of their adequacy to reduce the risk of injury to, or death of, employees to an acceptable level overall safety management	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp to demonstrate the implementation of an integrated SMS as detailed in their accreditation application.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	30/06/2005
86. RailCorp should integrate its management of OHS into its overall safety management	Supported and being implemented.	Requirements to be part of SMS.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	30/06/2005
88. The RailCorp passenger containment policy must be abandoned	Supported. RailCorp will review and replace the current containment policy, in consultation with ITSRR. The Commission recognised the complexity of determining appropriate policy and operational/technical arrangements for emergency egress from trains. Evidence to the Commission was that on some occasions passengers are best kept inside a train; in others they need to be able to escape. An independent risk	Risk Assessment conducted. Containment Policy reviewed. New Policy developed and implemented.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/03/2006

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	assessment of the alternatives to the current policy will be undertaken. This risk assessment will be consistent with recommendation 34, and the replacement passenger containment policy will be based on its results.					
89. There must be a minimum of two independent methods of self-initiated emergency escape for passengers from all trains at all times.	Requires further detailed review, subject to the risk assessment referred to in R88.	ITSRR has undertaken an initial review and recommended options for a standard. ITSRR to develop principles for an appropriate standard incorporating review findings and refer matter to NTC for development of a national standard.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	* 30/09/2006
90. All passenger trains must be fitted with an internal passenger emergency door release.	Requires further detailed review. See R 89.	ITSRR has undertaken an initial review and recommended options for a standard. ITSRR to develop principles for an appropriate standard incorporating review findings and refer matter to NTC for development of a national standard. ITSRR to ensure operators comply with standard.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	* 30/09/2006
91. All passenger trains operating in New South Wales must be fitted with external emergency door releases which do not require any special key or other equipment to operate.	Supported and being implemented. RailCorp has commenced a modification program to ensure all external emergency door releases do not require special keys or other	ITSRR has undertaken an initial review and recommended options for a standard. ITSRR to develop principles for an appropriate standard incorporating review findings and refer matter to NTC for	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	* 30/09/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
	equipment to operate.	development of a national standard. ITSRR to ensure operators comply with standard.				
92. The internal passenger emergency door release should be fitted with a facility which prevents it from operating unless the train is stationary.	Requires further detailed review. See R 89.	ITSRR has undertaken an initial review and recommended options for a standard. ITSRR to develop principles for an appropriate standard incorporating review findings and refer matter to NTC for development of a national standard. ITSRR to ensure operators comply with standard.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	* 30/09/2006
93. The operation of the train doors should have an override facility whereby the train driver or the guard can override an internal passenger emergency door release system if the door release is interfered with when there is no emergency. There should be an alarm, together with an intercom, in the train guard's compartment so that, if a passenger attempts to initiate an emergency door release, there is an appropriate delay during which time an alarm sounds in the train guard's compartment and the guard can then, after first attempting to speak via the intercom to the person concerned, if necessary, override the door release, and make an appropriate announcement over the intercom system in the train.	Requires further detailed review. See R 89.	ITSRR has undertaken an initial review and recommended options for a standard. ITSRR to develop principles for an appropriate standard incorporating review findings and refer matter to NTC for development of a national standard. ITSRR to ensure operators comply with standard.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	* 30/09/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
94. The risk of abuse of internal passenger emergency door releases should be further reduced by introducing significant penalties for any improper use of such an emergency facility. It should be a criminal offence for anyone to use or tamper improperly with an emergency escape facility in a train.	Supported.	Appropriate Legislation introduced.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Closed		30/03/2006
95. All passenger trains operating in New South Wales must have the external emergency door release clearly marked with the words 'Emergency Door Release'.	Supported and being implemented.	ITSRR has undertaken an initial review and recommended options for a standard. ITSRR to develop principles for an appropriate standard incorporating review findings and refer matter to NTC for development of a national standard. ITSRR to ensure operators comply with standard.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	* 30/09/2006
96. All RailCorp operational personnel should be trained in the location and operation of external emergency door release mechanisms.	Supported and being implemented.	RailCorp to provide: a) Evidence of Development of Training Program that addresses issues. (Includes Development Process, Training Aids / Curriculum.) b) Evidence of Appropriate Assessment Competency.(Delivery of course by appropriately qualified trainers.) c) Evidence of process to ensure the training of new staff and the Refresher training of existing staff. d) Review process built-in, to take into account relevance and	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	30/04/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
		changes.				
97. All emergency services personnel should be trained in the location and operation of emergency door release mechanisms on all rail cars.	Supported in principle and being implemented through other means. RailCorp has produced a training DVD showing the location and operation of external emergency door release mechanisms. 500 copies have been provided to each of Fire Services, Police and Ambulance. The very large number of emergency response personnel (including volunteer services) that may respond to a rail incident, means training of all personnel in the RailCorp Framework is unlikely to be achievable. Emergency Services will investigate with RailCorp extension of the DVD into a multimedia resource to improve the ability to educate wider numbers of emergency service workers.	Agreement between RailCorp and Emergency Services in place on most effective means of communication / training for location and operation of emergency door release mechanisms on all passenger cars. Training aids developed/distributed.	NSW Emergency Services	Closed		31/03/2006
98. All trains should have windows available through which passengers can escape.	Requires further detailed review. See R 89.	ITSRR has undertaken an initial review and recommended options for a standard. ITSRR to develop principles for an appropriate standard incorporating review findings and refer matter to NTC for development of a national	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	* 30/09/2006

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
		standard. ITSRR to ensure operators comply with standard.				
99. All new rail cars must have appropriate signage and lighting identifying escape routes in the case of emergency.	Supported.	ITSRR has undertaken an initial review and recommended options for a standard. ITSRR to develop principles for an appropriate standard incorporating review findings and refer matter to NTC for development of a national standard. ITSRR to ensure operators comply with standard.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	* 30/09/2006
100. All new rolling stock must be designed with an area of the roof through which emergency services personnel can access a rail car without encountering wiring or other equipment. That access point must be clearly marked with words such as "emergency services cut here".	Requires further detailed review. See R 89.	ITSRR has undertaken an initial review and recommended options for a standard. ITSRR to develop principles for an appropriate standard incorporating review findings and refer matter to NTC for development of a national standard. ITSRR to ensure operators comply with standard.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	* 30/09/2006
101. ITSRR should initiate and/or participate in the development of a national standard for crashworthiness of all passenger trains.	Supported.	ITSRR will refer matter NTC for development of National Regulation. ITSRR will adopt National Regulation. In the interim ITSRR will ensure compliance with existing industry standards through its accreditation process.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	* 30/09/2007
102. RailCorp should make it a condition of employment that all level 2 managers have or obtain a formal qualification in system safety management.	Supported in principle for further review. RailCorp has developed and implemented a program of safety science training for senior managers	Program Implemented to ensure all level 2 Managers obtain formal qualifications in System Safety Management. Position description to reflect criteria.	RailCorp	Closed		31/10/2005

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
	(levels 2, 3 and 4). A comprehensive review of available formal qualifications in system safety management, including international practice, with an option of having RailCorp's training formally recognised.					
103. RailCorp should establish clear safety accountability statements and reporting lines for all management positions.	Supported.	Accountability Statements implemented for all management positions.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/03/2006
104. The RailCorp Board should establish independent external safety auditing processes to regularly audit and report to the Board on the implementation of an integrated safety management system by RailCorp and on safety performance generally. The RailCorp Board should establish independent external safety auditing processes to regularly audit and report to the Board on the implementation of an integrated safety management system by RailCorp and on safety performance generally.	Supported and being implemented.	Program established that provides for Independent External Safety Audit. Independent External Safety Audits conducted.	RailCorp	Closed		31/07/2005
105. The RailCorp Board should ensure that RailCorp has an adequate and integrated safety management system, including adequate systems for risk assessment, clearly defined safety	Supported and being implemented.	Implementation of RailCorp Safety Management System. Clearly defined accountabilities to be in the SMS documents.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/12/2005

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
responsibilities and accountabilities for persons holding management positions, and specific performance criteria against which evaluations can be made of safety performance and accountability for safety performance of all managers.						
106. The RailCorp Board should require a full review of the safety competence of RailCorp managers to ensure that each has the ability to bring about those safety reforms recommended in this report which are applicable to his or her position. The RailCorp Board should require a full review of the safety competence of RailCorp managers to ensure that each has the ability to bring about those safety reforms recommended in this report which are applicable to his or her position.	Supported.	Review undertaken by RailCorp. Recertification plans developed.	RailCorp	Closed		31/12/2005
107. RailCorp should ensure that where the safety competency of any manager is deficient such manager is required to undertake professional development courses to raise his or her safety competency level to an adequate standard.	Supported.	Review undertaken by RailCorp. Recertification plans developed.	RailCorp	Open	Acceptable Response	30/09/2006
108. RailCorp should conduct internal and external safety audits to evaluate the adequacy of its safety management system and to ensure that any risk control	Supported and being implemented. RailCorp's annual safety audit plan includes audits to evaluate the adequacy of its safety	Internal/External Audit plan developed. Evidence of Audits conducted/Audit Reports. Develop rectification plans. (link to 104)	RailCorp	Closed		31/07/2005

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
measures are effective.	management system and risk control measures. The 2005 audit plan includes 4 external audits.					
109. Following completion of any external audit, a corrective action plan to remedy any identified safety deficiencies should be developed by RailCorp, implemented and followed up within the business groups affected, to ensure appropriate and timely completion of the action plan, by a formal examination of the effectiveness of the controls put in place. Senior management personnel should certify that the corrective action plan has been implemented and is effective. Senior management personnel should be accountable for any such certification.	Supported.	Develop rectification plans. Formal closeout procedures/processes in place and monitoring program in place.	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/03/2006
110.a) A Safety Reform Program Director (hereafter referred to as SRPD), reporting directly to the Chief Executive of RailCorp, should be retained to manage, as head of a Safety Reform Program Office, any safety reform program being undertaken by RailCorp. The SRPD should work with the Chief Executive and senior management to ensure the implementation of an integrated safety management system and the cultural change required. The SRPD must have	Supported.	Position established/filled. Position Description reflects responsibilities in recommendations 110 (a) - (e).	RailCorp	Closed		31/07/2005

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
<p>qualifications suitable for recognition by the Australian Institute of Project Management as a master program director. He or she should report to and be under the control of the Chief Executive, to ensure that the accountability of the Chief Executive is not reduced. The SRPD should co-ordinate and integrate any existing rail safety reform programs and, in consultation with and with the authority of the Chief Executive he or she should: a) assign responsibility for particular aspects of the project to identifiable employees;</p>						
<p>110.b) ensure that each person to whom such an aspect of the program has been assigned has the time and resources to undertake the tasks each is required to perform</p>	Supported.	Position established/filled. Position Description reflects responsibilities in recommendations 110 (a) - (e).	RailCorp	Closed		31/07/2005
<p>110.c) identify the period of time during which such persons are required to achieve the desired safety outcome for the particular aspect of the program;</p>	Supported.	Position established/filled. Position Description reflects responsibilities in recommendations 110 (a) - (e).	RailCorp	Closed		31/07/2005
<p>110.d) specify a clearly defined scope of work to be undertaken, a schedule setting out when such work is to be completed, and institute a system of measuring whether or not the objectives have been achieved in the time</p>	Supported.	Position established/filled. Position Description reflects responsibilities in recommendations 110 (a) - (e).	RailCorp	Closed		31/07/2005

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
specified; and						
110.e) report to the Chief Executive of RailCorp on a monthly basis on each aspect of the program, and the Chief Executive is to report on a monthly basis to the RailCorp Board and to ITSRR, on the progress of each program.	Supported.	Position established/filled. Position Description reflects responsibilities in recommendations 110 (a) - (e).	RailCorp	Closed		31/07/2005
121. A safety management system regulation should be promulgated, specifying the requirements of safety management systems in all accredited organisations, using Annexure I to this report as a guide.	Supported in principle for implementation through other means. ITSRR will introduce regulations that set out the expectations (or performance outcomes) required of industry. The regulations will be developed on a national basis, through the National Transport Commission process, to ensure consistent application across the Australian rail industry.	ITSRR will refer matter National Transport Commission for development of National Regulation. ITSRR will adopt National Regulation. In the interim, ITSRR has developed NAP which sets out requirements and has made NAP a condition of accreditation.	Independent Transport Safety & Reliability Regulator	Open	Acceptable Response	* 30/09/2006
122.a) RailCorp should establish an integrated safety management system which includes the following: a) a formal performance management system, incorporating measurable safety accountabilities and responsibilities for each managerial position;	Supported. The RailCorp Board has approved the safety strategic plan and the engagement of external experts to assist in the development of an integrated safety management system for RailCorp. The safety management system has been developed and will be implemented in 2005, consistent with the	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/12/2005

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
	requirements of RailCorp's provisional accreditation. (a) RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.					
122.b) defined safety accountability and responsibility statements for senior management;	RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/12/2005
122.c) an effective means of reviewing and acting upon audit investigation and review findings	RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/12/2005
122.d) an effective system for managing audit and investigation findings, to ensure that	RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/12/2005
122.e) criteria for recruitment and promotion of management staff, including safety management qualifications, experience and expertise	RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/12/2005
122.f) development of risk management procedures, including	RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/12/2005

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
122.f.i) analysis of the nature of the activities being undertaken	RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Closed		31/12/2005
122.f.ii) identification of all potential hazards within those activities	RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Closed		31/12/2005
122.f.iii) analysis of the nature of the hazard	RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Closed		31/12/2005
122.f.iv) analysis of the risks of the hazard materialising	RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Closed		31/12/2005
122.f.v) development of controls to mitigate the risk;	RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Closed		31/12/2005
122.f.vi) development of systems for monitoring the effectiveness of the controls to ensure that they are working;	RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/12/2005
122.f.vii) development of a continuing program to enhance the development of safe practices at all levels of the organisation;	RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Closed		31/12/2005

Recommendation	Government Response	ITSRR Expectation	Agency	Status	ITSRR Assessment	Target Date
122.f.viii) development of key performance indicators for safety performance by all persons in management positions;	RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/12/2005
122.f.ix) development of a safety information data collection system which captures all hazards, occupational health and safety incidents, audit results, non-compliance findings and near miss reports;	RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/12/2005
122.f.x) development of a system to arrange in priority order, on the basis of data and trend analysis, those safety deficiencies which require the most urgent attention;	RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/12/2005
122.f.xi) design and implementation of communications protocols, including standard phraseology, with particular standard phraseology for emergency situations; and	RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Open	Agency Claims Closure	31/12/2005
122.f.xii) development of training systems, based upon training needs analysis.	RailCorp will review its integrated safety management system against this recommendation to ensure consistency.	RailCorp to review its SMS to ensure that it incorporates requirements from recommendation 122 (a) - (f).	RailCorp	Closed		31/12/2005