

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The Special Commission of Inquiry (SCOI) into the Waterfall Rail Accident released its Final Report on 17 January 2005. In accordance with the Commission's recommendations, the NSW Government agreed that the Independent Transport Safety and Reliability Regulator (ITSRR) should report quarterly on implementation progress. This is the tenth Quarterly Report. It outlines progress made between 1 April and 30 June 2007.

### **Implementation Summary**

Further progress was made during the quarter with the verification and closure of 10 (6%) recommendations in the area of passenger safety. All these recommendations were directed at ITSRR as the regulator to implement. At the end of the reporting period, the cumulative implementation progress to date for all 177 recommendations (including 127 recommendations and 50 sub-elements) was as follows:

- 167 (94%) recommendations verified and closed<sup>1</sup>;
- 3 (2%) recommendations have slipped;
- 2 (1%) recommendations previously claimed for closure by agencies has been given a revised status - open-acceptable response;
- 1 (1%) recommendation (the introduction of national communications technical standards) will be implemented by 2010; and
- 4 (2%) recommendations referred to the National Transport Commission (NTC) have revised implementation timeframes based on advice from the NTC.


This brings the total number of recommendations currently closed or claimed by agencies to be closed to 170 or 96% of all recommendations.

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<sup>1</sup> including 5 that were rejected by the NSW Government and 1 which is no longer applicable

The current status of all of the safety actions, compared to that in previous quarters, is summarised below:

**GRAPH 1: PROGRESSIVE STATUS OF ALL RECOMMENDATIONS BY QUARTER**



As time has progressed the peak has shifted along the x-axis as the recommendations are closed.

## Slippage

During the reporting period three recommendations were not satisfactorily addressed and could not be verified by ITSRR. As a result, ITSRR will request that RailCorp provides revised target dates for these slipped recommendations which are as follows:

- In the reporting period ITSRR was unable to verify implementation of recommendations 1 and 20. The intent of Recommendation 1 is to ensure that staff working in the Rail Management Centre (RMC) have been trained to quickly and accurately assess an emergency has occurred and obtain accurate and reliable information which can be conveyed to emergency response personnel to facilitate a timely and effective response. Recommendation 20 requires all Railcorp's operational rail staff to be trained in the emergency action checklist relevant to their position.

During the quarter, ITSRR reviewed a RailCorp investigation report into a major disruption to the RailCorp network that occurred in March causing significant delays and necessitating the evacuation of passengers from stranded trains. A number of issues that require further clarification and areas not specifically covered in the investigation report have been identified. As a result ITSRR has commenced its own investigation into the incident under the *Rail Safety Act 2002*. These recommendations have therefore slipped with a revised target date to be advised (Recommendations 1 & 20).

- Recommendation 53 requires train inspections to be carried out at the time of stabling RailCorp trains, as well as a part of train preparation prior to entering service. The purpose of this reform is to ensure that train defects are detected early so that sufficient time is allowed for their

repair. This should reduce pressure on those inspecting the trains just prior to service from allowing trains to enter into service with defects that could impact on their safe operation.

RailCorp has claimed closure of this recommendation, noting that they have a process for inspecting trains at the time that they are stabled and at time of preparation prior to service. ITSRR has been provided with documentation outlining that process.

The inspection process has been distributed for information to RailCorp staff.

RailCorp has also provided ITSRR with a copy of an internal verification report on the process demonstrating that inspections are undertaken.

However, to enable closure of this recommendation, ITSRR requires evidence that faults identified from inspections at stabling are recorded in RailCorp's electronic defect reporting database (METRE) and are being rectified before the train preparation inspection prior to entering service. ITSRR is also seeking confirmation that RailCorp has a process for reviewing faults identified during train preparation to determine whether they should have been identified during the inspection at stabling.

During the quarter, RailCorp was unable to produce this documentation, and the recommendation's implementation has therefore slipped. During the next quarter ITSRR will write to RailCorp seeking confirmation of whether this process is in place, and if not, requesting a revised timeframe for this to be implemented (Recommendation 53).